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A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority

China Not a Military Threat
China Puts Economic Growth Above Hegemony
JOHN GERSHMAN
rior to the attacks of September
11, China appeared to be the
Bush administration's prime candidate for the target of a new Cold War.
Campaigning on the idea of China as a
"strategic competitor," the first few
months of the Bush administration
were marked by the largest arms sales
package to Taiwan in a decade, enthusiastic support for theater and national Nanchang celebrates the People's Republic of
missile defense systems and space China's 50th anniversary. Photo by Robin Carton
weaponry, and a downgrading of official
China's military policy and how it relates
contacts with China. The spyplane imbroto the image of China as a strategic comglio crystallized these tensions, although
petitor and threat, particularly because the
they had eased by the time of the Septempolicies pursued by the US can have a sigher 11 attacks. The Pentagon's 2001 Quanificant effect on the evolution of Chinese
drennial Defense Review released just afmilitary strategy.
ter the attacks focused on the threat ofterSince opening to the world economy in
rorism but it did note - in an implicit refthe late 1970s, military modernization has
erence to China- that "Asia is gradually
been subordinated to the imperatives of
emerging as a region susceptible to largeeconomic growth and modernization. (It
scale military competition."
was the fourth of Deng Xioaping's "Four
It is instructive therefore to examine
Modernizations.")

P

Guest Editors Note:
This special issue of the Newsletter is devoted solely to China, with articles solicited
to collectively provide a brief but fairly comprehensive overview of the major dimensions of the country today. Readers wishing documentation for any of the materials
contained in this issue, or those interested in reprint information, may write to the
individual author(s) c/o of RESIST. For those seeking longer, more detailed articles on
contemporary China from a progressive perspective, China: Beyond The Headlines,
edited by Timothy Weston & Lionel Jensen, is highly recommended (Rowman & Littlefield,
2000). -Henry Rosemont, Jr.
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Except for a brief skirmish with Vietnam over a disputed South China Sea islet
in 1988, China has not resorted to the use
of force since its disastrous attack on Vietnam in 1979. By and large, China has acted
as a satisfied power, having increased economic ties with all its neighbors and negotiated border agreements with most neighboring countries. Only in the case of Taiwan is there a real danger of conflict. Beijing
has been quite clear that it is willing to use
force if Taiwan declares its independence.
Nuclear Threat

China offers no serious strategic threat
to the United States. China now has at most
about 40 long-range nuclear missiles with
sufficient range to reach the continental
United States, and although it has the ability to place multiple warheads on its missiles, it has so far chosen not to do so. A
single US nuclear-armed submarine carries
more warheads than the entire inventory
of Chinese warheads capable of reaching
the United States-meaning that even if
China were to triple its current number of
nuclear missiles, the strategic balance
would not be fundamentally altered. The
Chinese continue to rely on a "minimal deterrent" policy and have the barest of abilities to retaliate with nuclear force should
they come under nuclear attack.
China's second-generation nuclear
force, which is to be deployed over the next
10 to 15 years, will be far more mobile, accurate and reliable than its current force.
continued on page two
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Yet this force is likely to remain small in
comparison to the US nuclear arsenal, even
if the Bush administration unilaterally reduces United States nuclear forces . A critical factor shaping China's decision on the
number ofICBMs to deploy will be whether
China feels that a smaller deterrent will be
threatened by US national missile defense.
Increases in China's military spending
have also garnered some recent press attention. Using the broadest definition of
such spending- including foreign weapons purchases and research and development-China's is roughly $40 to $50 billion
when corrected for purchasing power parity. This is about equal to what Japan
spends, while the US spends more than
seven times as much. The double digit increases in the official military budget over
the 1990s appears to tell a story of a rapidly growing military. But the Chinese military was cut from a force of over 4 million
in the 1980s to fewer than 2.5 million today.
After rising by 12% in 2000 in real terms,
official defense spending will increase this
year by nearly 18%, a rate at which it would
double every four years. Double-digit increases in nominal defense spending were
common in the 1990s, but high levels of
inflation, especially in the early part of the
decade, offset much of the real value of
these increases. Much of the increases in
the 1990s also went into better pay and
living conditions for the troops and officers, and in the past two years, as compensation for the forced divestiture of the military from commercial enterprises.
Shifts in Military Forces
Right-wing hysteria to the contrary,
China lacks any kind of a "grand strategy"
that integrates economic, military, and diplomatic efforts in pursuit of foreign policy
or security objectives. Nevertheless, the
Party leadership shares some basic strategic goals: regime survival, preserving territorial integrity (namely insuring against
Taiwan's permanent separation from China,
preventing Tibetan independence, quelling uprisings among Muslim populations
in Xinjiang) and increasing China's "comprehensive national power" (zonghe guoli)
and prestige on the international stage. The
sometimes-conflicting nature of pursuing
these objectives has shaped military strategy and military modernization.
In the late 1990s, the Chinese military
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The subordination of military modernization
to economic growth is largely because
economic growth is the only policy that helps
meet Beijing's broader strategic goals.
shifted from a doctrine concerned with a
defensive ground war to a doctrine based
on a more balanced, flexible and smaller
military able to operate outside of territorial waters. This new doctrine concentrates
on force and force projection rather than
simply on national defense. The centerpiece of this emerging doctrine has been
the Chinese Navy (PLAN), which in the
past had been regarded as the least important among all the services.
Two major factors contributed to this
strategic shift. Chief among them is growing economic and political instability in the
region, an unclear picture of the US commitment to the area and uncertainty over
the emerging Japanese role in the region.
The second factor affecting China's military strategy is energy security. China is
the largest consumer of oil outside of the
US. China will need to rely more on imported oil to sustain its economic growth.
Much of this oil is transported by sea, thus
the increased importance of safeguarding
sea lines of communication (SLOC).
China's navy has over 1,100 warships,
more than three times the number of ships
in the US Navy. Unlike the US Navy, however, the PLAN is primarily geared toward
a coastal defensive role. It has only 54 major combatants accounting for only 5% of
the total number of ships. In the short term,
the PLAN is developing a "green water"
capability, meaning the ability to operate
out to the first island chain- all areas to
the west of a line running from Japan, the
Senkaku islands, Taiwan and the west
coast of Borneo. By 2020, the PLAN aims
to have the ability to expand this force into
a "blue water" capable navy, a force able
to assert control over the second island
chain, including areas west of the Kuril Islands down to the Mariana islands and
Papua New Guinea. Although China is
working hard to develop a more sophisticated green water navy, it is more than 15
years away from having a significant blue
water navy. China's air force has only recently changed its doctrine to taking the
RESIST Newsletter

fight beyond the coast and lacks the refueling capability to operate at any significant distance from its shores.

Taiwan
Taiwan is widely viewed as the flashpoint that could bring China and the US
into military confrontation. The key elements in China's strategy towards Taiwan
emerged roughly 20 years ago, when it
made a decisive shift away from a policy of
confrontation and liberation through the
use of military force to one of reunification
through negotiations. Since Chen Shuibian's election as Taiwan's president in
early 2000, China accelerated its efforts to
expand cross-Straits economic ties. With
China and Taiwan both in the WTO, these
ties are likely to continue to increase, mak-
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China Not a Military Threat
ing war more costly for both sides.
The critical point is that Taiwan is not a
military issue for China's leadership, but a
political one. The Communist Party's political concerns over losing face on the Taiwan issue by allowing its permanent separation from the mainland combine three related issues: sincere nationalism and the
fear of national breakup; tactical nationalism and fears about Party legitimacy; and
individual leaders' fear for their own ability to survive the succession process and
to preserve their historical legacies.
The Bush administration's willingness
to significantly increase the weapons sold
to Taiwan earlier this year, and the prominence of supporters of Taiwan's independence among top levels of the Bush administration have made Beijing more uneasy than ever about the future of Taiwan.
China already has a couple of hundred
short-range ballistic missiles across the
strait from Taiwan and will likely have several hundred near the middle of this decade.
It does not have the capacity to invade
Taiwan, a scenario that would be counterproductive in any event. A more likely scenario would be some kind of blockade combined with missile attacks, and even there,
China's air force is inferior to Taiwan's.

Emphasis on Economic Growth
For China, like other countries, the pursuit of strategic interests has been one driving force behind engagement in international organizations and support for multilateral cooperation. However, some specific
examples highlight ways in which its Party
leadership has been willing to sacrifice actual military advantage to avoid being
viewed as a pariah state operating outside
the norms of international society. This includes, most notably, the signing of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996,
which reduced dramatically the speed of
China's nuclearweapons developmentprogram.
The subordination of military modernization to economic growth is largely because economic growth is the only policy
that helps meet all of Beijing's broader strategic goals. It enables the Party to "buy
off' opposition and to channel funds to
poorer regions and ethnic minority areas
to try to prevent violent uprisings. It also
provides additional leverage over Taiwan,
as the island becomes increasingly dependent on the mainland economy for trade
and investment opportunities. Hundreds
Vol. 11, #1

of thousands of Taiwan citizens live part
or all of the year in mainland cities such as
Shenzhen or Shanghai. And Taiwan provides the resources and tax revenues for
strengthening China's power overall. For
the foreseeable future, economic growth
and the instability associated with the particular path the Party has chosen to achieve
such growth will be the major focus of concern for China's leadership, not new military adventures.
The economic, social, and political limits on China's military modernization explain in large part why China is extremely
unlikely to become either a peer competitor of the United States or a regional hegemon in the security arena during the next
10 to 15 years. But the trajectory of China's
military modernization and strategy will also

be shaped by the policies of other countries in the region, particularly the US. Recklessly pursuing missile defense and advocating independence for Taiwan strengthens hardliners within Chinese policy
circles, reducing the security of both China
and the US and making a new Cold War
with China more likely. A preferable course
would emphasize verifiable arms control
initiatives, support for closer cross-Straits
ties and negotiations between China and
Taiwan, and strengthened multilateral security-related institutions in the region.

John Gershman is a senior analyst at the
lnterhemispheric Resource Center and
Asia/Pacific editor for Foreign Policy in
Focus.

Aggression or Coexistence?
China -s Intentions towards Southeast Asia
ANDREW WELLS-DANG
hina has been all but absent from the
media and political mouthpieces ofUS
elites since September 11, but up until that
date conservative ideologues and military
planners were hard at work attempting to
make the Chinese into the next Cold War
enemy. It all seems so far away now. The
fabricated "Cox Commission Report" told
of supposed Chinese attempts to steal the
nation's nuclear secrets. The Pentagon's
Quadrennial Defense Review was poised
to name China as the main strategic threat
to US interests and reorient military deployments and targets towards Asia. Rumors
flew of Chinese capabilities to nuke Los
Angeles if the US defended Taiwan in a
conflict. After Chinese fighters collided
with a US spy plane in April, ChineseAmericans were singled out for the same
ignorant prejudice that Arabs and Sikhs
are today. China, the rising power in Asia,
threatened American dominance (another
word for "hegemony" or "empire").
Of course, now that global terrorism has
been identified as the enemy du }our, confrontation with China no longer seems imminent. But the underlying question of
China's role in the world will not be going
away. Once the current war is over and
done with, Washington elites will still need
an enemy, and China will still have 1.3 bil-
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lion people and an independent foreign
policy. The debate over Chinese intentions
may be on hold for now, but it will certainly
be back with a vengeance soon enough.
Before jumping to any conclusions
about China's intentions towards the US,
however, it might be helpful to assess perceptions of China among its neighbors,
peoples who deal with the Chinese on a
much more immediate level than Americans
generally do. Those who take alarmist
views of Chinese intentions might be surprised to learn that Southeast Asians generally do not share these concerns, instead
viewing China as a partner with fairly benign intent.

China and the Asian Neighborhood
Historically speaking, China's involvement in Southeast Asia has been economic
and cultural rather than military or political. With the exception of northern Vietnam, which China occupied for a thousand
years and periodically attempted to retake
during the Yuan and Ming dynasties, China
has never shown expansionistic desires
towards the south. (Indeed, Vietnam might
well be described as a country that used to
be part of China, but then became independent-a feat that the Tibetans and
Uighurs, not to mention the Zhuang or Bai
minorities, have so far been unable to
continued on page four
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match.) In place of armies or missionaries,
China sent traders and merchants. Ethnic
Chinese migrants have long dominated
economic activity in the region, a pattern
that has generally functioned smoothly in
Malaysia and Thailand, less so in Indonesia or Vietnam. Chinese products and techno logy flooded urban markets, though
China made little or no effort to use its influence in local politics.
Southeast Asia's historical coexistence
with China was interrupted by European
colonialism, then by Japanese occupation
and Cold War rivalries. From 1950 through
the 1970s, ideology separated China ( and
North Vietnam) from the Southeast Asian
nations dominated by the US. When five
of these nations- Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippinesformed the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, anti-communism
was a key motivating factor.
With the decline of ideological communism and China's re-entry into international
economics and politics under Deng
Xiaoping, however, ASEAN's character
also changed. The association now consists of 10 countries, including Cambodia,
Laos and Vietnam, as well as Brunei and
Burma (Myanmar). With a variety of political systems, the ASEAN countries are no
longer unified on many issues, but all enjoy increasingly good relations with China.
As a result, China's economic and cultural exchange with Southeast Asia is returning to its historical levels. Chinese-produced clothing, televisions and pirated
CDs are everywhere in the region. Economic nationalists sometimes object on
grounds of protecting domestic industry,
but the Chinese presence is there to stay.
Especially in the poorer ASEAN nationsLaos, Cambodia and Burma-China is a
major investor and donor of development
assistance. Ethnic Chinese across the region
are re-establishing ties with the mainland,
and nouveaux riches Chinese nationals are
arriving in growing numbers as tourists.
From the Southeast Asian point of view,
China is still the big neighbor to the north.
By virtue of size alone, it will always be
treated with respect. ASEAN has sought
to include China in its own consultations
through the "ASEAN + 1" and (along with
Japan and South Korea) the "ASEAN + 3"
gatherings, as well as the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) to address security concerns.
continued on page seven
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US-China Relations
Myths and Realities
CATHERINE LYNCH

N

ews of US-China relations, as with
other international news in the US, is
episodic and ephemeral. Reports of visits
to the US by the Dalai Lama or the president of Taiwan, of arrests in China of USbased Chinese scholars, even news of the
collision of a US spy plane and a Chinese
jet, appear suddenly and then disappear.
Yet there are ready, mythic formulae
through which these events are perceived,
making them immediately recognizable.
These enduring myths hinder more reflective consideration of the relations between
the US and China.
The myth through which Americans
tend to perceive China tells us that the
Chinese government is militantly opposed
to human rights and is aggressively expansionist. While its current form is congruent with the popular prophecy of a coming
"clash of civilizations," our China myth has
historical roots going back to before our
" loss of China" to Communism in 1949 at
the start of the Cold War. Where earlier we
spoke of Nationalist China, followed by
Nationalist Taiwan (until recently a oneparty state) as "Free China," now we speak
of the Tibetan emigre community (a theocracy) as "Free Tibet." Using the Korean
War as an excuse, the US sent its Seventh
Fleet into the Taiwan Straits, some 700 hundred miles to the south. Nearly half a century later, in 1996, the US again sent two
aircraft carriers into the Straits. China, in
the first case as part of world Communism,
and in the second case, still Communist,
apparently an aggressive state wit];i expansive designs, was a state in need of containment.
Our myths concerning China are mirrored by myths in China of the US. China
counters our trumpeting of human rights
with "Asian values" and a critique of the
failings of US society. With historical roots
going back to the experience of the nineteenth century, an image of the West persuasive to the Chinese portrays imperialistic powers bent on dominating China rather
than according it an equal position in the
world. Chinese Communism effects a stance
of national restoration in the face of a WestRESIST Newsletter

em, and now specifically American, hegemony. A pattern of the US threatening to
invade China during the Korean War continues today with the 1999 bombing of the
Chinese embassy in Belgrade, an act of war
in which four people were killed, and the
collision of a US spy plane at the Chinese
border with a defending Chinese jet whose
pilot was killed.
Recent moves by the Bush administration have bolstered China's myths, despite
opportunities for alternative policies. After drifting for some time, the Clinton administration had arrived toward its end at a
policy of "engagement" with China. Bush
has moved back to the Cold War policy of
"containment." Bush's "Blue Team" of
China advisors, so named after the American side in the US Space Command's simulated war games this past January against
the "Red Team" representing China, included no China experts, who were seen as
being soft on China. The result is an increasingly aggressive stance toward China,
with stepped up aerial electronic spying at
China's borders (which bad begun in the
last months of the Clinton administration).
It is also evident in the Bush administration's
withdrawal from the Tokyo Accords on the
environment and in its proposal of a new
version of Star Wars.
In his rejection of the Tokyo Protocol
on global warming, Bush criticized China,
along with India, for backing lower green
house gas standards for developing countries than developed ones. True to China's
myth of the US, Bush appeared to be trying to thwart China's economic growth. The
National Missile Defense program (NMD)
and associated Theatre Missile Defense
(TMD) are clearly aimed at China. [See
Bruce Gagnon, "Missile Defense is a Trojan Horse," RESIST Newsletter, October
2001 , 10:8.] With TMD systems encircling
China and the prospect of a functional
NMD, the deterrent value of China's tiny
nuclear arsenal- fewer than 50 nuclear missiles as opposed to the US 's 7 ,500-pluswould disappear, leaving China vulnerable
to US attack.
China and the US do share some common ground. Both governments have had
economic and financial interests in seeing
China successfully become a member of
continued on page seven
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Change, Struggle in China
HENRY ROSEMONT, JR.

I

n the conduct of its foreign affairs, China
was noticeably cooperative and conciliatory throughout 2001. It was not bellicose in disputes with Vietnam and the Philippines over ownership of several groups
of large rocks in the South China Sea; it
accepted less than a formal apology from
the US for a spy plane 's intrusion into Chinese-claimed air space; Jiang Zemin's meeting with George Bush in late October was
cordial, if not warm; the government made
trade concessions to ease its accession to
the World Trade Organization, and still others in its successful bid for the 2008 Olympic Games; and it made no sabre-rattling
statements to Taiwan either before or after
the parliamentary elections in early December, in which the Guomindang- the most
pro-unification party on the island now- suffered a humiliating defeat, losing control of
the legislature for the first time since 1949.
The US world-wide "War on Terrorism"
should contribute significantly to continuing these conciliatory foreign policies in
2002. While China cannot do much in the
conduct of this war, and however much the
administration wants to see it as a threat to
"national security," the US can ill afford to
alienate the Middle Kingdom from the coalition Bush and Powell must hold together
to prosecute the war. This is particularly
true if Europe begins to show signs of disengagement. The Chinese government certainly endorses the destruction of Al Qaeda
networks in order to maintain stability
among its eight million Muslim Uighurs in
Xinjiangprovince (1 ,000 of whom, according to the foreign ministry, have been
trained by Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and
Pakistan). And while the new US-Pakistan
relation will cut into China's arms sales,
the problem of nuclear weaponry falling
into the hands of extremists now falls to
the US, not China.
It is all to the good that China faces no
imminent crises or problems abroad, for it
has a surfeit of them on the domestic front:
growing labor unrest in the cities and peasant uprisings in the countryside; evergrowing disparities between the haves and
have-nots, and between the coastal regions
and inland; escalating environmental degVol. 11, #1

radation; wholesale corruption; a steady
decline in the status of women; increased
economic competition from abroad-demanded by WTO accession- combined
with woefully inefficient banking, tax, and
social services administrations to meet that
competition; and intimately linked to all of
these problems, the loss of the country's
moral compass.

The Plight of Workers and Peasants
Even the state-controlled media regularly report urban unrest among workers
whose economic conditions are wretched.
The Zhengzhou municipality's statistics
bureau, for example, reported that pensioners from its factories have received less
than one-sixth of their stipends for the past
4 years, while a number of workers in another industrial city farther northShenyang- have not been paid since 2000.
Demonstrations protesting these conditions are growing both in size and number,
and government responses have become
more draconian, with beatings and arrests
now common. Official records claim 60,000
incidents of urban labor protests for 1998,
growing to 100,000 in 1999.
In rural areas the number of protests may
be three times higher, as farmers are not
paid for their crops---or issued worthless
scrip--and are being swindled out of their
land. Much is being made of the growing
number of millionaires in Shanghai, Beijing
and Guangzhou, but 50 million of China's
rural poor still subsist on less than $1 a
day (official figures), and nearly three times
that many must live on $2 a day.
The plight of rural women is particularly
gruesome. With over 125 million men
obliged to leave their villages to become
the "floating population" working· in the
cities- at low wages and no benefits- the
women must assume full responsibility for
the feeding, care, and well-being of the elderly, the sick, and the young as well as work
the fields left by the men, with little or no
labor-saving equipment. Against this background certain appalling statistics should
come as no surprise: with 18% of the
world's population of women, China accounts for almost 60% of female suicides,
and is the only country where female suicides outnumber the male.
A large number of urban women are not
RESIST Newsletter

appreciably better off than their rural sisters. They, too face economic hardship
when their working husbands are not paid,
not to mention losing their own salaries
and pensions as well.
But the problem is more general. After
liberation in 1949 the Party and government
made significant strides in overcoming the
inferior status of women, but the gains are
eroding. Very few women occupy positions
of power or influence in the upper echelons
of the Party or government; an increasing
number of opinion pieces in the media argue that if more women returned to the
hearth there would be enough jobs for men;
few of the new millionaires are women; female infanticide has not abated appreciably, nor has the practice of selling young
girls to sweatshops or brothels.

The Environment
The Chinese natural environment is an
ecologist's nightmare. Water tables on the
North China plains have dropped 150 feet
since 1949, and some official estimates predict that unless the situation is reversed,
not merely halted, Beijing may become uninhabitable by 2015. Less than 3% of the
land mass- 1/5 larger than the continental
US- remains forested. Over 75% of China's
sewage flows untreated into its streams and
rivers. The amount of land reclaimed for
agriculture each year is less than the
amount lost to desertification. Six of the
ten cities in the world with the highest levels of air pollution are in China, and fully a
fifth of the residents therein suffer some
form of chronic respiratory disease. Even
the plight of the pandas and other endangered species unique to China has worsened in recent years, owing to both loss of
habitat, and profits to be made from their
sale, or the sale of their pelts, or their organs for medicinal or aphrodisiacal purposes.

Economic Reform and the WTO
It is now a decade since Deng Xiaoping
announced on his Southern tour that "To
get rich is glorious," signaling a renewal of
the economic reforms that had begun in
the 1980s, but halted in the aftermath of
the Beijing Massacre of June 1989. By any
standard the overall economic conditions
of the country have improved considerably since then. Food and clothing are in
abundance, as are refrigerators, TVs, air conditioners, and not a few lux
items as well:
continued on page six
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Huaihai Road in central Shanghai looks
very much like Rodeo Drive in Hollywood.
This leap in productivity has not been
matched, however, by fundamental changes
in the banking or legal systems, nor in agencies supposedly responsible for environmental protection, corporate oversight, tax
collection, or social services. Without these
major reforms, it will be increasingly difficult to sustain economic growth.
A key example of these problems, and
their interconnections, is the banking system. The government requires banks to
make and re-make major loans at low interest rates (currently 5%) to large-scale state
enterprises that have not been profitable
for some time, and may never become so
again. This policy is of course a capitalist's
nightmare, but there is a reason for maintaining it: China has no equivalent of Medicare, Social Security, FHA (or even a functioning IRS); all social services in the cities-from housing to day care to health
clinics to pensions- are provided by the
factory unit which employ the workers,
hence shutting down the factory shuts
down all the services on which the workers and their families depend.
Worse, the present system invites massive corruption. The market rate for loans
is currently 12%, so it certainly must tempt
entrepreneurs to bribe banking officials to
make loans at the government rate. Economists at Beijing University recently estimated that $34 billion (US) has illegally
changed hands in this way in recent years.
Another untoward effect of the current
banking system is that the size and number
of loans that must be made to state enterprises each year severely reduces the monies available for the purchase of such things
as automobiles by individual consumers.
Shortly after WTO rules go into effect in
China, however, overseas automobile companies like GM and Volkswagen will be able
to provide their own financing for their cars,
placing domestic manufacturers thereof at
a great competitive disadvantage.
Indeed, all Chinese domestic producers
will be playing on a distinctively uneven
field for the China market after WTO accession. Many of these firms have some
capital, market access, know-how, hardworking employees, and produce high quality goods and services. But it remains true
that the large multinational corporations
employ the preponderance of knowledge
Page 6

A "rugged individualism" ethical orientation
is seen as anathema to most,
but necessary for survival today.
workers, with state-of-the-art electronic
technology available for their managers and
financial "deep pockets." It is for this reason that the Chinese government moved so
slowly in 2001 toward WTO accession: it
continues to request concessions from the
organization in order to maintain a modicum of regulative control over domestic
commerce (an idea deemed important by
the framers of the US Constitution as well).
Drawing on the example of South Africa, the government is also seeking licensing permission to produce several generic
medicines, including the AIDS cocktail (the
UN estimated a million cases of AIDS in
China for 2001 ). Very probably it is also
attempting to develop a "dual use" policy
for its defense budget: WTO rules permit
protective legislation to harbor industries
deemed essential for a country's national
security, and China's recent efforts to upgrade its military may in part be designed
simply to continue to protect certain domestic industries-especially large stateowned ones.
Why Be Moral?
If there is a central thread woven
throughout these social, political, and economic problems facing China today, it is
the moral thread; the country seems to be
adrift today in its value orientation. The
Party lost part of its moral status during
the upheavals it itself created during the
Cultural Revolution of 1966-76. Its moral
bankruptcy became obvious to all during
the Beijing Massacre of June 3-6, . 1989.
And the problems created by its policies
during these periods do not allow for moral
solutions that will promote the good, or
even mitigate evil.
Most educated Chinese today are awash
in opportunities to enhance their economic
well being. Many of them are doing so in
accordance with Deng's slogan, and there
is little check on this impulse, in part because economic liberalization reduces the
Party's ability to re-institute the draconian
ethos of the Cultural Revolution.
Yet there is a pressing question abroad
in China today, namely, "What does it mean
RESIST Newsletter

to be Chinese?" A socialist, egalitarian
ethos cannot continue to have any purchase when the government encourages
competition among Hong Kong's multimillionaires to become the first capitalist to
join the Chinese Communist Party. A statesponsored (in the North) resurgence of interest in the Confucian heritage of China
emphasizes its regressive, and not progressive dimensions, and hence is not appealing to those anxious to emulate the West.
A "rugged individualism" ethical orientation is seen as anathema to most, but necessary for survival today, and hence followed even when vilified.
Even when not harassed-or worseby the authorities, religious organizations
are not gaining many adherents, especially
among the educated; little moral rejuvenation can be expected from this source.

New Vision Needed
A renewed moral vision is sorely needed
in China today. The earlier economic reforms have raised measurably the standard
ofliving of many Chinese, perhaps as many
as 400-plus million of them. But that means
the quality oflife of over 800 million Chinese has remained static, or declined. A
more just distribution of the country's productive wealth will not, in the end, be
brought about solely by economic, political or social policies, but by a moral commitment to do so on the part of all Chinese.
Similarly, it must be moral arguments that
will bring to an end human rights abuses
(which are real, even if regularly overblown
in the US media), insure gender equality,
bring a greater degree of autonomy for Tibetans and other minority peoples in China,
and generate an abiding commitment to
repair its natural environments for future
generations.
All of this is necessary if China is not
merely to continue to "stand up," but stand
tall in the politics among nations in the
twenty-first century, as it has often done
in the past.
Henry Rosemont, Jr. has been a member
of the RESIST Board since 1969.
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Aggression or Coexistence?
continued from page four

Some progress has been made on these
fronts, including a Sino-Vietnamese border treaty. One large outstanding issue remains, namely sovereignty over several
piles of rocks and oil fields in the South
China Sea, but regional dialogue has at least
prevented the dispute from escalating.
There is, however, one strong exception
to the above positive picture: Taiwan.
Beijing's leaders, especially those in the
People's Liberation Anny, have made no
secret of their willingness to use force
against Taiwan if peaceful means of reunification fail. The fact that China's tactics
have leaned more towards bullying than
persuasion have not endeared the idea of
unification to many Taiwanese. For their
part, Southeast Asians hope the Taiwan
issue will be resolved nonviolently, as the
ASEAN countries have economic and cultural ties with Taiwan that are in some cases
at least as great as with the mainland. [See
Gershman article on page one for more information.]
Americans should have nothing to fear
from the growing ties between China and
Southeast Asia. If China is not threatening
its neighbors, how could it possibly pose
a security risk to the US? A peaceful, prosperous and culturally vibrant Asia contributes to international stability. More specifically, clear-thinking progressives should
encourage multi-polar alternatives to
American corporate and political dominance, holding out at least the possibility
of a different development model than the
one the US and its World Bank/IMF lackeys have rammed down small countries'
throats. ASEAN stands little chance of creating an effective alternative on its own,
but with Chinese support its prospects are
somewhat better.
In the few cases where Chinese involvement does come with disagreeable strings
attached (for instance, opposition to a
Khmer Rouge tribunal in Cambodia, or support of the Burmese military junta), Western countries can balance Chinese influence through other multilateral means. A
China that is engaged in Asia and the world
will also be more open to international pressure. Given that China puts its economic
interests first, it can often be persuaded to
drop political concerns if trade or development appears at risk.
Given the growing connections between
China and its neighbors, it should be
Vol. 11, #I

pointed out that the sort of demonizing of
China that occurred prior to September 11
hurts American interests not only in China
but in the rest of Asia as well. Southeast
Asians prefer to keep good relations with
all major powers where possible. If they
are forced to choose between China and
the US, however, size and geographical
considerations alone impel them towards
the neighbor to the north. The US would
do well not to insist on creating another
divided world.
Andrew Wells-Dang is the Washington
representative of the Fund for Reconciliation and Development, advocating for
normal relations between the US,
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. He can be
reached at frdwash@mindspring.com.

US-China Relations
continued from page four

the World Trade Organization (WTO). And
China played a role in restricting the extent
of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. They
share interests in law enforcement, including control of drugs, illegal immigration,
copyright infringement, and-since September I I-terrorism, as the US joins China,
already facing its own Islamic terrorists in
its northwest. Finally, both China and the
US have worked together in negotiating
with North Korea.
Despite this common ground, the Bush
administration has adopted the Cold War
approach of confrontation and containment. In so doing it has increased tensions
and the potential for conflict in the region.
Bush pulled away from discussions with
North Korea, increased arms sales to Taiwan, and tilted toward Japan, including
both of these under his missile defense
umbrella. The September 11 th attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon appeared to open the way for new, more cooperative policies. However, while it has
changed some things, September 11 th has
not changed everything. The recent US announcement that it would cease to be a
party in the ABM treaty signals that, despite rhetoric about a war on terrorism, the
US will continue to wage a new cold war
on China.
Bush's policy to "contain" a threatening China has the effect of solidifying corresponding Chinese images of a hostile US
bent on denying China its rightful posiRESIST Newsletter

tion. And governments not only maintain
myths through their actions but also can
be constrained to act within them. The US
pushes China toward its own myth of national restoration and its determination to
hold on to Tibet and to reintegrate its old
territories, most notably Taiwan. A confrontational US enhances the political position of hard liners in the Chinese government and fosters a nationalism which weakens domestic critics. Younger Chinese, in
contrast to the older democratic activists,
have been increasingly drawn to the rhetoric of nationalism.
But talk of relations between states and
their governments tends to constrict our
thinking, preventing us from seeing how
mythologizing one country can serve the
interests of the other. We might, for example, realize that the US portrayal of China
as an expansionist power running roughshod
over human rights serves US interests as
an arms exporter in an unstable world. We
might equally realize that while there are
most certainly human rights abuses in
China, the stock image of China as the worst
abuser and Tibet as the greatest victim is
hardly consistent with a balanced appraisal
of a world in which far worse abusers are in
the camp of US allies.
To take another example, on the issue
of China and the WTO, US labor argued
against the engagement stance of supporting China's membership on the basis of
China's poor human rights record, when
their basic concern, of course, was cheap
competition. Our myth of China as a human rights abuser has tempted us away
from the real issue which is not whether
China is worthy of membership in the WTO
but the WTO itself, which does not serve
the best interests of either the Chinese or
US workers.
Thus our choices are not confined to
only containment or engagement. What we
should do, instead of taking sides in a debate shaped by our myths, is take our clues
from progressive potentials which are
emerging within Chinese society, in a labor
movement, in an environmental movement,
or in village protests-movements which
US progressives can overwhelmingly endorse.

Catherine Lynch teaches modern
Chinese history at Eastern Connecticut
State University.
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(;RANTS
RESIST awards grants six times a year to
groups throughout the United States engaged in activism for social and economic
justice. In this issue of the Newsletter we
list a Jew grant recipients from our December 2001 allocation cycle. For information, contact the groups at the addresses
below.

Philippine Forum
122 West 27th Street, 10th Floor
New York, NY 10001
philforum@juno.com
Since 1996, the Philippine Forum has
sought to bring the Filipino-American
community into the movement for economic and social justice. As a multi-issue
organization, they work to appeal to the
broadest audience within their community. Through one of their programs, the
Youth Initiative for Social Action (YISA),
they raise the social, political, and cultural consciousness of Filipino-American
youth through training in direct action
and advocacy techniques. Their YISA
Activists Summer Camp is designed to
make youth familiar with the social and
cultural history of their Filipino/FilipinoAmerican communities as well as issues

that particularly affect these communities, including the roles of global institutions such as the IMF and World Bank.
Resist awarded the Philippine Forum a
grant of$2,600 to fund the operating
costs of the summer camp.

Action for Community and
Ecology in the Regions of
Central America (ACERCA)
PO Box 57
Burlington, VT 05402
ACERCA is a US-based organization
addressing social and environmental
justice issues throughout Central
America. Through various campaigns,
ACERCA links communities working
toward ecological, social, and economic
self-determination in the region. In recent months they have made connections
between the war in Afghanistan and ongoing military and economic assaults
against Central American communities.
Resist's grant of $2,600 will be used to
fund solidarity organizing against the "War
on Terrorism" and to hold a community
teach-in, which will make connections
between Central American issues and the
anti-war/anti-globalization movements.

••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Join the Resist Pledge Program
We'd like you to consider
becoming a Resist Pledge.
Pledges account for over
30% of our income.
By becoming a pledge, you help
guarant~e Resist a fixed and dependable
source of income on which we can
build our grant-making program.
In return, we will send you a monthly
pledge letter and reminder along with
your newsletter. We will keep you
up-to-date on the groups we have
funded and the other work being done
at Resist.
So take the plunge and become a Resist
Pledge! We count on you, and the
groups we fund count on us.

Yes/ I'll become a
RESIST Pledge.
I'll send you my pledge of $_ _
every month/quarter/six months/
year (circle one).
[ ] Enclosed is an initial pledge
contribution of $___ .
[ ] I can't join the pledge program
now, but here's a contribution of
$___ to support your work.

PO Box 1445
Boise, ID 83701; Asanch46@qwest.net
The Idaho Hispanic Caucus Institute for
Research and Education (IHC) initially
emerged as a volunteer organization to
influence redistricting efforts in Idaho. It
has since turned its attention to building
a statewide coalition of Latino organizations to advocate for social justice for
Latinos and people of color in Idaho.
Through this coalition they hope both to
build the political influence of Latino
communities in Idaho and empower community leaders to organize around the
social and economic issues facing their
communities.
RESIST awarded IHC a grant of $2,100
for general support.

Oregon Human Rights Coalition
2710 NE 14th
Portland, OR 97212 OHRC01@aol.com
Oregon Human Rights Coalition has
been organizing against punitive welfare
reform laws for more than 10 years.
Through their education and community
organizing work, OHR offers tools for
low-income people to advocate for themselves on behalf of their communities.
Currently they are focusing their organizing work on the state's Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families re-authorization policy through self-advocacy
trainings, community organizing, and
public education events.
Resist awarded a $1,800 grant for
general support of their organizing.

2001 RESIST
Grant Totals

Name _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Address _ _ _ _ _ _ __

City/State/Zip _ _ _ _ __
Phone _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Donations to Resist are tax-deductible.
Resist • 259 Elm Street • Suite 201 • Somerville • MA • 02144

Idaho Hispanic Caucus
Institute for Research
and Education

•

Multi-YearGrants: ........... $51,000.00
Emergency Grants: ............ $2,100.00
Priority Grants: .............. $245,800.00
NWTRCC: ......................... $2,574.50
TOTAL: .... .......... ....... .... $301,474.50
# Groups Funded: ...................... 136

••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
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